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Fifteen	years	from	now,	in	2030,	what	changes	will	India	have	made	to	its	nuclear	
doctrine	and	posture?	Fifteen	years	is	a	long	period	of	time,	and	it	is	difficult	to	know	
what	India’s	strategic	landscape	will	look	like	at	the	end	of	it.	Nonetheless,	it	is	possible	
to	make	some	reasonable	assumptions	about	India’s	future	strategic	environment	and	to	
explore	possible	implications	for	Indian	nuclear	policy.	
Today,	China	and	Pakistan	are	the	main	sources	of	India’s	strategic	challenges.	Pakistan	
continues	to	support	a	proxy	war	against	India,	using	Islamist	militants	to	attack	targets	
in	Indian	Kashmir	and	India	mainland.	In	doing	so,	it	hopes	to	attrite	Indian	resources	
and	remake	territorial	boundaries,	wresting	Jammu	and	Kashmir	from	Indian	control.	
China	has	been	enjoying	rapid	economic	growth,	and	assembling	a	military	that	is	
increasingly	able	to	assert	coercive	pressure	against	states	in	the	Indian	Ocean/Asia	
Pacific	region.	Enduring	Sino-Indian	border	disputes	make	these	problems	even	more	
worrisome	for	India.	Both	sets	of	problems	are	longstanding;	they	have	been	at	the	
forefront	of	Indian	security	concerns	for	well	over	the	past	15	years,	and	it	seems	safe	
to	assume	that	they	will	remain	there	in	2030.	
Even	as	they	have	endured,	these	challenges	have	also	changed	in	important	ways,	and	
they	will	continue	to	do	so.	India	will	have	to	adjust	to	the	new	realities	that	they	pose.	
Below,	I	discuss	these	changes	and	possible	Indian	nuclear	responses.	I	argue	that,	given	
Pakistan’s	move	to	full-spectrum	deterrence,	including	battlefield	nuclear	weapons;	and	
China’s	combination	of	increasing	military	power,	authoritarian	preferences,	and	
coercive	behaviour,	India	in	2030	may	wish	to	consider	changes	to	its	nuclear	posture,	
including	the	development	of	more	flexible	nuclear	capabilities	to	ensure	that	it	has	
options	across	a	broader	spectrum	of	the	escalation	ladder;	and	reconsideration	of	its	
commitment	to	no-nuclear-first	use.	It	will	also	have	to	consider	the	tradeoffs	involved	
in	pursuing	a	robust	sea-based	deterrent	and	missile	defences.	In	both	cases,	despite	the	
attractions	of	robust	capabilities,	strong	arguments	exist	in	favour	of	more	limited	
approaches,	and	they	will	be	deserving	of	serious	consideration.	The	purpose	of	this	
discussion	is	not	to	offer	policy	prescriptions.	Rather,	I	suggest	possible	directions	in	
which	Indian	nuclear	posture	could	move	in	coming	years,	and	explore	some	of	the	costs	
and	benefits	of	various	approaches,	as	India	seeks	to	generate	security	for	itself	in	an	
increasingly	challenging	strategic	environment.	
Pakistan	
The	main	challenge	on	the	Pakistan	front	will	be	its	move	towards	full-spectrum	nuclear	
deterrence,	which	includes,	most	importantly,	battlefield	nuclear	weapons.	The	
Pakistanis	have	found	that	nuclear	weapons	provide	an	excellent	complement	to	their	
longstanding	strategy	of	using	Islamist	militants	to	challenge	India’s	control	of	Kashmir,	
enabling	them	to	behave	more	boldly	than	they	otherwise	could,	knowing	that	any	
Indian	retaliation	would	necessarily	be	limited.	This	approach,	however,	is	premised	on	
Pakistan’s	threat	to	use	nuclear	weapons	first	in	the	event	of	a	large-scale	Indian	
conventional	attack.	And	this	threat	may	lack	credibility.	For,	by	using	nuclear	weapons	
first	and	inviting	an	Indian	nuclear	response,	the	Pakistanis	are	threatening	to	turn	
danger	into	catastrophe.	Would	the	Pakistan	really	do	this?	If	their	nuclear	weapons	are	
successfully	to	deter	an	Indian	conventional	attack,	the	Indians	will	have	to	believe	that	
the	answer	is	yes.	The	need	to	ensure	credibility	of	this	threat	has	become	especially	
acute	as	Indian	economic	growth	has	outpaced	Pakistan’s,	India	has	undertaken	major	
conventional	military	improvements,	and	the	United	States	and	India	have	become	close	
strategic	partners.[2]	
In	order	to	address	this	problem,	Pakistani	is	devising	a	tactical	nuclear	capability.	It	
will	employ	short-range,	low-yield	weapons	integrated	with	troops	close	to	the	Indo-
Pakistan	border,	with	launch	authority	probably	pre-delegated	to	officers	in	the	field	at	
some	point	during	a	crisis.	This	promises	to	make	Pakistani	first-use	threats	more	
credible	in	two	ways.	First,	battlefield	nuclear	weapons	are	relatively	small	and	will	be	
employed	against	military	targets;	they	will	not	require	Pakistan	to	launch	large-scale	
attacks	against	Indian	cities.	The	choice	to	escalate	a	conventional	conflict	to	the	
nuclear	level	may	thus	be	less	momentous,	and	therefore	easier	for	Pakistan	to	make,	
than	it	was	before.	Second,	during	a	crisis,	the	decision	to	employ	battlefield	weapons	
may	not	be	fully	in	the	hands	of	Pakistani	national	leaders.	Rather,	the	decision	may	be	
delegated	to	a	field	commander	embroiled	in	a	conventional	fight,	who	could	prove	
more	willingness	to	choose	escalation	than	senior	leadership	making	decisions	in	
relative	calm,	far	from	the	front	lines.[3]	Of	course,	even	as	they	potentially	enhance	
credibility,	such	measures	also	create	significant	concerns	regarding	physical	custody	of	
the	weapons	as	well	as	the	integrity	of	command	and	control.[4]	
Pakistan’s	battlefield	nuclear	capability	is	still	emerging.	Pakistan	first	test-fired	its	
short-range	Nasr	missile	only	in	2011.	Although	Nasr	appears	to	have	entered	service	
after	further	testing	in	2012	and	2013,	it	is	not	certain	if	Pakistan	has	been	able	to	
miniaturise	warheads	sufficiently	to	use	with	the	missile.[5]	Fifteen	years	from	now,	
however,	Pakistan’s	battlefield	nuclear	capacity	is	likely	to	be	far	more	sophisticated.	
This	may	pose	a	problem	for	Indian	nuclear	doctrine,	which	threatens	only	large-scale	
strikes,	designed	to	inflict	overwhelming	costs	on	the	enemy.[6]	This	could	leave	India	
with	no	means	of	responding	proportionately	to	limited	nuclear	use.	Thus,	India	may	
find	itself	in	much	the	same	quandary	as	US	was	under	the	massive-retaliation	doctrine	
during	the	1950s,	lacking	a	credible	way	of	responding	to,	and	potentially	deterring,	
low-level	provocations.[7]	
India	could	adopt	an	approach	to	this	problem	similar	to	US	efforts	to	address	it	during	
the	Cold	War—building	flexibility	into	its	potential	nuclear	responses.	Specifically,	India	
can	make	clear	that	it	reserves	the	right	to	respond	to	nuclear	attack	proportionately,	
from	low	levels	to	the	highest	rungs	of	the	escalation	ladder.	Doing	so	may	require	India	
to	acquire	smaller	weapons	and	shorter	range	delivery	platforms.[8]	But	India	should	
be	able	to	do	so	without	the	custody	and	command-and-control	problems	generally	
associated	with	forward	deployment	and	pre-delegation	of	launch	authority.	The	reason	
is	that	India	would	not	need	to	use	these	smaller	nuclear	weapons	first	to	deter	a	
Pakistani	conventional	attack.	Rather,	it	would	use	the	weapons	only	in	response	to	low-
level	nuclear	use	by	Pakistan.	Thus,	in	Pakistan’s	case,	India	may	be	able	to	create	
flexible	options	that	enhance	deterrence	without	falling	prey	to	some	of	tactical	nuclear	
weapons’	more	pernicious	effects.	
China	
Although	China	has	long	been	a	subject	of	Indian	concern,	its	ability	to	exert	coercive	
leverage	over	India	and	the	region	is	increasing.	At	root,	China’s	coercive	power	comes	
from	its	economy.	Rapid	economic	growth,	averaging	just	under	10	percent	per	year	
since	1978,	has	facilitated	major	Chinese	conventional	military	improvements,	
particularly	in	the	areas	of	cruise	and	ballistic	missiles;	command	and	control;	
intelligence,	surveillance,	and	reconnaissance;	and	cyber	networking,	all	of	which	will	
enhance	China’s	conventional	precision-strike	capabilities.[9]	It	has	also	enabled	China	
to	modernise	its	nuclear	force,	including	continued	growth	of	its	warhead	arsenal;	
development	of	road-mobile	missiles	armed	with	multiple	independently	targeted	
reentry	vehicles	(MIRVs);	and	buildup	of	its	sea-based	deterrent.[10]	
It	is	difficult	to	know	how	the	Chinese	economy	will	perform	in	the	coming	decade	and	a	
half	since	it	has	slowed	significantly	in	recent	years,	declining	from	just	over	14	percent	
in	2007	to	approximately	6.9	percent	in	2015.[11]	India	has	enjoyed	impressive	
performance	since	undertaking	market	reforms	in	the	early	1990s,	and	has	averaged	
growth	just	below	7.5	percent	per	year	over	the	past	decade.	Nonetheless,	India’s	
economy	will	remain	far	smaller	than	China’s	in	the	coming	decades,	with	India’s	GDP	
reaching	approximately	$6.6	trillion	by	2030	and	China’s	topping	$22	trillion.	Japan,	the	
only	other	Asian	country	predicted	to	rank	in	the	top	10	world	economies,	is	expected	
to	produce	about	$6.4	trillion	in	2030.[12]	Thus	Chinese	power	is	likely	to	continue	to	
grow	relative	to	India	and	the	larger	Asian	region	in	the	years	ahead.	How	will	China	
conduct	itself?	
The	answer	to	this	question	is	not	entirely	clear.	China	appears	to	be	moving	in	an	
increasingly	authoritarian	direction,	with	President	Xi	Jinping	recently	receiving	the	
title	of	“core	leader,”	which	will	enable	to	him	to	exert	even	stronger	control	over	the	
country	in	the	years	ahead.[13]	Such	domestic	political	arrangements	do	not,	of	course,	
translate	directly	to	particular	foreign	policy	behaviour.	They	do,	however,	suggest	that	
Chinese	preferences	may	be	more	coercive	than	deliberative.	This	concern	is	
compounded	by	numerous	examples	of	aggressive	Chinese	strategic	behaviour,	
including	territorial	reclamation	projects,	refusal	to	submit	territorial	disputes	to	
international	arbitration,	establishment	of	an	air	defence	identification	zone	in	the	East	
China	Sea,	and	repeated	and	protracted	incursions	across	the	Line	of	Actual	Control	
separating	India	from	Chinese-controlled	territory.[14]	In	addition,	China	has	been	
strengthening	its	relationship	with	Pakistan,	helping	it	to	develop	the	Gwadar	Port	in	
Baluchistan	as	part	of	the	$46	billion	China-Pakistan	Economic	Corridor,	which	will	link	
China’s	Xinjiang	Province	with	Pakistan	and	the	Arabian	Sea.[15]	
These	developments	will	ensure	a	robust	nuclear-weapons	capability,	which	will	
become	especially	important	to	India	in	the	years	ahead.	Nuclear	weapons	will	provide	
assurance	that	even	if	China	amasses	a	significant	preponderance	of	power	at	the	
conventional	level,	it	will	be	limited	in	its	ability	to	coerce	or	otherwise	harm	India.	This	
can	help	India	not	only	to	defend	itself	against	outright	military	aggression,	but	also	to	
resist	pressure	to	conform	to	Chinese	economic,	legal,	and	territorial	preferences.[16]	
Will	India’s	current	nuclear	doctrine	be	helpful	in	its	efforts	to	withstand	Chinese	
conventional	military	pressure	and	achieve	these	goals?	India	has	pledged	not	to	
employ	nuclear	weapons	first	against	an	adversary;	it	will	do	so	only	in	response	to	a	
nuclear	or	chemical/biological	weapons	attack	on	its	homeland	or	forces	deployed	
abroad.[17]	Such	a	no-first-use	(NFU)	policy	is	well	suited	to	a	conventionally	stronger	
party	that	can	deter,	and	if	necessary	defeat,	its	adversary	without	resort	to	nuclear	
weapons.	It	may,	however,	be	less	well	suited	to	a	conventionally	weaker	party	that	
might	need	nuclear	weapons	to	blunt	a	stronger	opponent’s	conventional	attack.[18]	If	a	
weaker	state	credibly	promised	not	to	use	nuclear	weapons	first,	it	could	undermine	its	
ability	to	deter	conventional	aggression	by	its	stronger	adversary;	the	adversary	could	
engage	and	defeat	the	weaker	state	at	the	conventional	level,	believing	that	it	was	
unlikely	to	face	nuclear	retaliation.	If	the	weaker	state’s	nuclear	capacity	is	to	deter	
conventional	aggression,	there	must	be	a	real	risk	that	it	will	use	nuclear	weapons	first	
in	a	conflict.	India	is	in	a	strong	conventional	position	relative	to	Pakistan,	and	thus	an	
NFU	posture	makes	sense	in	this	context.	India	is	in	a	weak	conventional	position,	
relative	to	China,	however.	India	may	therefore	wish	to	revisit	its	current	posture,	
perhaps	adopting	a	more	ambiguous	declaratory	policy	that,	while	not	embracing	first	
use,	would	sow	more	doubt	in	the	mind	of	a	potential	adversary	than	its	current,	clear	
NFU	stance.	Calls	to	rethink	no-first-use	already	animate	debates	within	Indian	strategic	
circles.[19]	They	are	likely	to	become	even	more	common	as	Chinese	capabilities	grow	
in	the	coming	years.	
In	its	efforts	to	deter	China,	India	may	also	seek	more	flexible	nuclear	options,	including	
choices	at	the	lower	levels	of	the	escalation	ladder.	India	faces	potential	challenges	from	
China	on	two	fronts:	along	its	northern	borders	in	Aksai	Chin,	Sikkim	and	Arunachal	
Pradesh	where	longstanding	territorial	disputes	continue	to	fester;	and	in	the	maritime	
domain	as	China	extends	its	reach	from	the	Western	Pacific	to	the	Indian	Ocean	and	into	
the	Middle	East	and	Africa.	One	approach	to	managing	this	two-front	problem	could	be	
for	India	to	attempt	to	freeze	the	status	quo	in	one	area	and	focus	attention	on	the	
other.	Nuclear	weapons	might	assist	the	Indians	in	doing	this,	protecting	the	northern	
borders	where	the	strategic	environment	is	relatively	static,	and	seeking	simply	to	
maintain	current	boundaries.	This	could	help	to	enable	India	to	devote	resources	to	the	
maritime	domain,	which	is	more	dynamic,	and	will	require	a	diverse	mix	of	military	
capabilities	to	meet	emergent	challenges.	Smaller,	battlefield-type	weapons	could	be	
preferable	for	the	northern-border	mission,	enabling	India	to	block	mountain	passes	
and	repulse	attackers	without	using	disproportionate	force—though	forward	
deployment	and	the	associated	pre-delegation	issues	would	create	custody	and	
command-and-control	concerns	similar	to	those	mentioned	regarding	
Pakistan.[20]	Indian	leaders	would	need	carefully	to	weigh	these	risks	against	nuclear	
weapons’	defensive	benefits	when	considering	this	type	of	approach	to	the	border	
problem.	
Sea-based	nuclear	weapons	will	be	another	potentially	attractive	option	for	India	as	it	
attempts	to	generate	deterrence	against	China.	With	the	recent	induction	into	the	Indian	
Navy	of	the	nuclear-powered	ballistic	missile	submarine	INS	Arihant,	and	the	testing	of	
the	K-4	sea-launched	ballistic	missile,	India	has	taken	significant	steps	towards	
developing	a	sea-based	deterrent	capability.[21]	Nonetheless,	the	programme	remains	
at	a	relatively	early	stage,	and	it	is	not	yet	clear	how	far	it	will	develop,	or	how	much	
India	will	come	to	rely	on	the	sea-based	leg	of	its	nuclear	capability.	
On	its	face,	a	sea-based	deterrent	has	much	to	recommend	it.	Hidden	beneath	the	oceans	
from	first-strike	dangers	that	threaten	ground	and	air-launched	nuclear	weapons,	it	can	
significantly	enhance	the	survivability	of	a	state’s	retaliatory	force.[22]	A	sea-based	
deterrent	can	also	have	downsides,	however.	Sea-based	weapons	are	technically	
complicated,	expensive,	and	pose	significant	command-and-control	challenges.	Their	
ability	to	launch	nuclear	strikes	from	close	abroad,	with	little	warning	time,	also	can	be	
destabilising.[23]	A	cheaper,	less	complicated,	and	potentially	less	destabilising	
approach	could	be	to	expand	India’s	arsenal	of	land-based	missiles,	enhancing	
survivability	through	sheer	number	of	weapons.	India’s	submarine	force	could	then	
focus	on	tasks	such	as	intelligence,	surveillance,	reconnaissance;	blockades;	and	SLOC	
interdiction.	Despite	a	sea-based	deterrent’s	obvious	attractions,	India	will	need	to	
carefully	consider	these	tradeoffs	as	it	decides	how	far	to	pursue	the	development	of	
sea-based	nuclear	capabilities.	
Finally,	in	the	years	ahead,	India	may	seek	to	defend	itself	from	nuclear	attack	by	
expanding	its	missile	defence	capabilities.	India	already	has	undertaken	significant	
efforts	in	this	direction,	including	development	of	indigenous	area-defence	capabilities,	
and	the	acquisition	of	ready-made	systems	from	countries	such	as	Russia	and	Israel.	The	
temptation	to	seek	to	develop	a	more	robust	shield	will	be	strong.	Missile	defences	are	
intuitively	appealing,	and	policymakers	naturally	wish	to	do	everything	possible	to	
shield	their	countries	against	nuclear	attack.	It	is	politically	difficult	to	explain	to	
constituents	why	they	would	potentially	forego	any	protective	capabilities	that	such	
systems	could	afford	them.	And	missile	defence	might	provide	some	real	protection	
against	small	nuclear	attacks	resulting	from	accidents	or	unauthorised	use.[24]	
Nonetheless,	it	is	worth	keeping	in	mind	problems	that	pursuit	of	a	robust	missile	
defence	capability	could	entail.	First,	technology	is	complicated	and	expensive	to	
develop.	Second,	adversaries	can	adjust	to	missile	defence	with	relative	ease;	it	is	
technically	far	simpler	to	overwhelm	a	missile	defence	system	with	additional	warheads	
or	decoys	than	it	is	to	make	the	system	marginally	more	effective.[25]	Finally,	missile	
defence	could	be	destabilising.	A	state	possessing	robust	missile	defence	could	launch	a	
counterforce	attack	on	an	adversary,	and	use	its	BMD	to	absorb	the	remainder	of	the	
adversary’s	second-strike	capability.	This	possibility	can	encourage	arms	racing,	and	
nuclear-first	use	in	a	crisis.	Pursuit	of	a	robust	missile	defence	capability	thus	could	
undermine	India’s	strategic	position	rather	than	improve	it,	consuming	scarce	resources	
and	increasing	competition	with	states	such	as	China.	As	a	compromise,	India	could	
consider	maintaining	a	modest	missile	defence	capability,	designed	to	absorb	small	
strikes	resulting	from	accidental	or	unauthorised	launch,	rather	than	seeking	to	develop	
a	robust	missile	defence	capable	of	real	damage	limitation	in	the	event	of	a	large-scale	
nuclear	exchange.[26]	This	could	enable	India	to	capitalise	on	the	strengths	of	missile	
defence	while	avoiding	the	cost	and	stability	problems	that	it	can	entail.	
Despite	the	difficulties	inherent	in	any	attempt	to	predict	the	future,	it	is	safe	to	assume	
that,	as	they	develop	nuclear	policy	over	the	next	15	years,	Indian	leaders	will	have	to	
grapple	with	the	issues	raised	in	this	paper.	In	discussing	these	issues,	I	have	not	sought	
to	make	policy	prescriptions.	My	purpose,	rather,	has	been	to	suggest	some	directions	in	
which	Indian	leaders	might	decide	to	go,	and	explore	tradeoffs	that	they	may	have	to	
consider,	given	some	of	the	basic	principles	of	nuclear	deterrence,	as	well	as	the	unique	
characteristics	of	India’s	strategic	environment.	Whatever	Indian	leaders	ultimately	
decide,	the	serious	consideration	of	alternatives	such	as	these	may	stimulate	debate	
that	can,	in	the	end,	help	lead	towards	better	nuclear	policy	decisions.	
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